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Constitutional Tinkering and Democratic Institutions: A Case Study of the 2019 Nigerian
Electoral Process
Introduction
“While you can have elections without a democracy, you cannot have a democracy without
elections.” Michael Bratton states this in his study of African elections.1 In his paper, “Second
elections in Africa,” he discusses the phenomena of analyzing the second set of elections in African
nation post-decolonization as a measure of the success of democracy in the nation.2 It is often taken
as an indication of a transfer of power and authority. In this field of study, Bratton and others have
shown the importance of an electoral system in the functioning of a democratic administration
particularly, the consolidation of democracy in a nation. As Bratton argues in his paper, elections do
not constitute a consolidated democracy but they are a necessary institution as part of an array
of institutions that are needed for a successful democratic state.3 Noting the importance of elections
and their systems, electoral institutions and processes are equally important. How these elections
are controlled, managed and executed are vital aspects of the electoral system. In many nations
around the world, such processes find their origin in the constitution. As with post-colonial African
governments, constitutions formed an integral part of the independence process. Electoral processes
are outlined in the constitution and are the products of the constitutional process. The development
of electoral systems is an important example to use in analyzing the impact of
constitutional tinkering on democratic institutions.
This paper will discuss the aspects of constitutional tinkering and its impact on democratic
institutions by looking into the constitutional tinkering in the Nigerian constitution and its impact
on democratic institutions focusing mainly on the electoral system. As a caveat, this paper focuses
on the electoral process within an electoral system and not the methods by which election systems
are determined. Thus, the paper focuses on the administration of elections and not the system by
which votes are to be cast such as plurality method, approval voting or simple majority
vote. Although the latter systems have a significant impact as to the outcomes of an election, the
more fundamental question concerning constitutional design is the method by which these elections
are administered and conducted. Though it is all well and good to have an innovative way of filling
seats in Parliament or electing the executive candidates, it may have little impact where there is an
inefficient system for counting these votes, encouraging voter turnout, providing campaign
finance guidance, delimiting political parties and screening candidates for contest.4

Constitutional Tinkering and Comparative Constitutional Design
Overview

Michael Bratton, Second Elections in Africa, 9 J. Dem. 51-66, 52 (1998).
Id.
3 Id. Bratton ultimately argues that second elections far exceed the importance of the watershed first round of
elections that signal the consolidation of democracy. His theory states that thus, second elections specifically
speak to the survival of these fledgling democracies and not merely consolidation.
4 See Raphael López-Pintor, Electoral Management Bodies as Institutions of Governance, U.N. Dev. Program,
https://bit.ly/2LU54Vz. This is a comprehensive analysis of the electoral management bodies all over the world.
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“Constitution? Wetin be dat? Me a never see constitution before o. Na wetin e bi?”5 “it is a
political mistake to call the document they are handing over a constitution. This is because, it has
nothing to do with the will of the people of Nigeria. It was done based on the way the military wants
it, it is only a guideline and therefore citizens should regard it as a guideline.”6 “We need to bring
these nationalities around a conference table to discuss how we are going to live together as a
country. As it is today, we are not a nation yet, we are a state.”7 “ The only effective solution to these
agitations is in transparent, people-oriented government that is responsible and responsive to the
needs of the governed.”8 Nigeria has had eight constitutions. The first four were enforced and
developed prior to its independence and the latter four are post-independence with significant
suspensions due to military rule. In contrast, the US has maintained a single constitution albeit with
a slew of major amendments, for 230 years.
There is significant debate concerning whether the constitutions that are edited, updated and
amended lead to a more stable government than those that are not.9 It is of such significant
conversation that political science students are taught the connection between rigid and flexible
constitutions and how these are related to the administration of the government and are in fact, tied
to the character and expression of the state itself. For example, it is taught that the United Kingdom
operates with an unwritten and flexible constitution that accords with their parliamentary system of
government that permits for quick changes to constitutional norms.10 The arguments surrounding
constitutional tinkering and constitutional design form the core of this essay. Here, this essay seeks
to show the benefits and drawbacks of constitutional tinkering in Nigeria through its electoral
system.
Constitutional Tinkering
In this section, we seek to define the phenomena of constitutional tinkering and how it may
apply in our main discussion on the application of such values on the Nigerian constitution as it
pertains to the electoral process. In this discussion, several questions first arise; are modifications
or amendments examples of tinkering or must there be a constitutional death for the tinkering to
arise? Should such tinkering be the norm, that is, is there a number of years after which a
constitution seems to be optimal and as such, there should be a reevaluation of its usefulness? What
are the benefits of tinkering? The drawbacks? Is there a process the tinkering must follow and who
are the principal actors in this space? To answer the question of what constitutional tinkering is,
there must be discussion as to what the purpose is of constitutions. It has been made clear that in

Julius O. Ihonvbere, How to Make an Undemocratic Constitution, 21 Third World Quarterly, 341-366, 341 (2000).
This quote is a response from a Nigerian taxi driver to the question, ‘Have you ever seen the Nigerian
Constitution?’ Translation, “Constitution? What is that? I have never seen a constitution before. What is it?”
6 Alhaji Balarabe Musa, quoted in Saxone Akhaine, Musa urges legislators to reject constitution, Association for
Nigerian Scholars for Dialogue (1999).
7 Prof. B.O. Nwabueze, quoted in New African Magazine, Nigeria: Nine Constitutions in 24 years of democracy! (25th
Nov. 2013) The article title is misleading. At this point, Nigeria celebrating its 53rd anniversary and this article
comes as the President, Goodluck Johnathan was considering yet another constitution to replace the 1999
constitution. This constitution was never formed.
8 Dr. David Ononogbu quoted in New African Magazine, Nigeria: Nine Constitutions in 24 years of democracy! (25th
Nov. 2013).
9 See for example, ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG & JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL
CONSTITUTIONS 12 (2009); See also GEDION TIMOTHEWOS HESSEBON, CONTEXTUALIZING
CONSTITUTIONALISM 185 (2017).
10 See John Baker, The Unwritten Constitution of the United Kingdom, 15 ECCLESIASTICAL L. J., 4-27, (2013).
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our modern governance, constitutions are a precursor to statehood.11 More strongly, they are vital to
the survival of a state no matter the form they exist in.12
A more interesting question is why? Constitutions did not really exist as formal legal documents
until 1789 with the establishment of the official US Constitution. So, why are they so ubiquitous
now? There are two forms of this answer; the first is more economical and defined by the
constraints of rational actors, the second is more sociological and defined by the whims of history
and the cultural factors that affected the decisions of states at the time post-1789.
Constraints of rational actors
Where a constitution is found, there is likely to be some form of a democracy existing.
Following this logic, constitutions serve as a constraint to the rational majority power. By limiting
choice and only providing for evaluation of relevant factors, constitutions promote democracy by
ensuring that representation is protected.13 This is a brief explanation of this view. However, this
view makes the following assumptions that aid in understanding the importance of constitutions.
The rules provided by the constitution also pass a double check, they must be acceptable by
the majority and they must be reasonable. Equally important is the check they provide for
the minority view and the subsequent enhancement of the systems by which constitutional values
are facilitated such as a strong judiciary and electoral system. Another aspect of this view is that it
further shows that the constitution must further the ultimate goal of a democracy when it comes to
rulemaking; that is, the Kantian goal of presenting a standard that no one has a reasonable argument
to reject.14 Functioning in this manner, constitutions encourage debate on core issues and force
information into the public sphere. As a result of this, it is evident that the limits and constraints are
necessary conditions of constitutions and form their purpose. With the abundance of
choice available for manners in which to govern, the constitution encourages the double
check which necessarily eliminates those that do not pass the check.
Sociological Discussion
When discussing the purpose of a constitution, to outline the definition of
constitutional tinkering and its importance to Nigerian constitutional development,
these sociological and cultural factors come to the fore. A constitution born out of the necessity to
dethrone colonialism and establish a constrained independence is not the work of rational actors and
its purpose cannot be explained by the formulation described in the previous section. The rational
majority power is not constrained but rather constrains. There is no evaluation of relevant factors as
there is no common discussion of varying views. Views are not varied where the constitution is
a necessity for independence.
The Definition of Constitutional Tinkering
Where this is the defined purpose of constitutions, then the constitutional tinkering process must
provide and encourage this purpose and not detract from it. In fact, it may be said that where the
tinkering does not further this purpose, it actually serves to encourage the direct opposite of the
democratic nature of constitutions which is the death of the constitution through autocratic rule.15
See n10 infra. There are some states that do not have codified constitutions such as the UK and yet, it may still
be the case that these uncodified constitutions provide some guidance to statehood.
12 See NILS KARLSEN, JAMES BUCHANAN, WHY CONSTITUTIONS MATTER, 20 (2017).
13 Id at 5.
14 Id.
15 See for example, Lydia Gall, Hungary’s Latest Assault on the Judiciary, Human Rights Watch (14th Dec. 2018).
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Tinkering thus, involves considerations and changes affecting democratic participation,
economic development, national unity and political stability. More importantly, it serves to update
outmoded institutions. Where any of these goals are effected through the a constitutional change,
the constitution has been successfully tinkered with. Thus, these goals form our guideposts in
analyzing the constitutional tinkering occurring in the context of elections.
An Analysis of Constitutional Tinkering in West Africa
Carrying out an empirical analysis of constitutional change gives some gravity and clarity as
to the focus of this research. It helps narrow our analysis by bringing concrete examples of
constitutional change and flesh out some of the external factors that may be affecting the rates of
constitutional change in West African countries, including Nigeria. In addition, it aids in developing
the lexicon for analyzing these constitutional changes and the importance of the delineation between
amendments and replacements.
Concrete Factors
A preliminary analysis shows that there are 4 common factors in discussing the
constitutional trends of West African states. These factors have been determined through a focus of
the history of written constitutions of these states. As is the case with post-colonial states, written
constitutions are the norm. However, there is a debate as to whether these constitutions form the
fundamental aspect of determinant of governing within the state and whether there are other texts
or norms that form a part of this? To this question, the answer in this paper is to focus, at
this point on the quantifiable determinations on the fluctuations of the written constitutions in this
context. As was evident in the relevant time period, outward, concrete and formalist expressions of
statehood were key as was the implementation of a constitution. In this respect,
therefore, considerations of the various promulgated constitutions will be fundamental in
determining their impact on democratic institutions.
1.

The phenomena of Independence Constitutions

15 of the 16 West African states, this number is based on the UN’s description of West
Africa, have what I have determined as Independence Constitutions.16 These are constitutions
enacted solely to achieve independence from colonial powers. The only state not to have such
a constitution is Liberia as Liberia was not founded by African-Americans in the 1820s.17 These
independence constitutions have a few commonalities. They are threadbare in their provisions,
most highlighting the core debates surrounding independence and the core bargaining faced in the
negotiations with the colonizing powers. At this point, it is important to give a few
historical distinctions with the West African countries here. Consistently, there are three major
colonial powers at play: The United Kingdom, France and Portugal.18 The United Kingdom

See United Nations of West Africa, Map of West Africa, UNOWAS, https://unowa.unmissions.org/map (last
accessed Nov. 2019).
17 Angela Thompsell, A Brief History of the African Country of Liberia, ThoughtCo., https://bit.ly/2RVnMQj (13th
Feb. 2018).
18 Cf Nwando Achebe, Colonial Rule in West Africa, West African Senior School Certificate Examination History
Textbook, https://bit.ly/2EewHnU (last accessed Nov. 2019). This analysis argues that the major powers also
include Germany and Belgium. Though these were major powers in the establishment of colonial power in the
region, they were not the major powers that eventually led to decolonization in the region post- WWII.
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colonized: Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone and The Gambia;19 France colonized: Guinea, Mauritania,
Benin, Senegal, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Togo; Portugal colonized Cabo Verde and
Guinea-Bissau.20 For the Portuguese sphere of influence, independence came as a result of
Portugal’s Carnation Revolution, Revolução dos Cravos, in 1974.21 Where a military coup in Lisbon
overthrew the Estada Novo regime, the resulting political shift emphasized the need to secure the
independence of the African nations in the Portuguese empire.22 Thereafter in 1975, Cabo Verde
achieved a negotiated independence alongside Angola, Mozambique and Sao Tome and Principe.23
Guinea-Bissau tells a different story with a violent, worker-led revolution against the Portuguese
government beginning in 1956 and culminating with a unilateral declaration of independence in
1973, the year prior to the Carnation Revolution in 1974.24 In 1974, however, following the change
in Portuguese government, the Portuguese troops were removed from Guinea-Bissau and their
independence was officially recognized.25
For French and British West Africa, it was a different tale. Independence was negotiated with the
French government following an overwhelming campaign by activists such as Ahmed Sekou Touré
of Guinea and Leopold Sédar Senghor of Senegal.26 The same was done with the Crown by activists
such as Kwame Nkrumah. Thus, these independence constitutions serve a very formalist purpose on
the cusp of new government. In a similar manner to the experience of the United States and their
Articles of Confederation these constitutions needed to show independence and preparation
of international engagement whilst providing hope to the newly minted citizens without enhancing
strife or discontent. They had a tough job and were all unsuccessful. Noticeably, they were based on
the constitutions of their correspondent colonial powers. They adopted their forms of government
and the rights attendant in them. One thing is also clear, these constitutions served the bare
minimum to achieve statehood with the UN. The UN being an important indicator of true
independence in the ‘50s and ‘60s, these constitutions bore provisions that were akin to the UN
Declaration of Human Rights and the UN Charter, the core founding documents of what has been
argued by some as the formation of an international constitution.
2.

Coups, Civil Wars and Other Disruptions

As quickly as these constitutions were formed, they were replaced. The West African
countries, save for Cabo Verde and including Liberia, have all suffered through a coup or civil war
or other political disruption resulting regime change.27 This section gets into the question of to what
See Amy Tikkanen, British West Africa, Encyclopedia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/place/BritishWest-Africa (2nd March 2012)
20 The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica, French West Africa, Encyclopedia Britannica,
https://www.britannica.com/place/French-West-Africa (20th Jul. 1998)
21 See John Paton Davies, Revolution of the Red Carnations, New York Times, https://nyti.ms/2rArrsd (13th Jul.
1975).
22 Id.
23 The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica, The New State After Salazar, Encyclopedia Britannica,
https://www.britannica.com/place/Portugal (14th Dec. 2019)
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 See Frederick Cooper, The Politics of Decolonization of French and British West Africa, 7-10, Oxford Research
Encyclopedia (Jan. 2018).
27 See Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research Data Page, Center for Systemic Peace,
https://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html (last accessed Nov. 2019), this page contains raw data on all
coups from 1946-2018; See also Judd Devermont and Jon Temin, Africa’s Democratic Moment, Foreign Affairs,
https://fam.ag/2PGzOKI, (Jul. 2019).
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extent is constitutional change epiphenomenal? That is, to what extent was constitutional change
affected by the regime change here? Following an Independence Constitution, constitutional change
was often expected. However, coups present an interesting analysis. There have been 43 coups
across West Africa since the various declarations of Independence in 1960.28
The earliest coup occurred in Senegal in 1962 and the most recent was in Burkina Faso in 2015.29
These preliminary figures seem to underscore what I had been taught in Government class in
secondary school in Nigeria, coups bear a contagion effect, where one country experiences it, a
neighboring country may just do the same. And indeed, the frequency and spread of these coups
may echo this. In 1966, Ghana, Nigeria and Burkina Faso all experienced coups. Reflecting on the
status of the constitutions at the time, the result is a mixed bag.
The sustenance of a constitution during a coup is in effect determined by the coup itself, the
reasons behind it, the purposes or objectives of the coup plotters and the impact of public
participation. In some instances, the installed regimes promoted the constitution,
others suspended the constitution and operated by military decree and yet others used the coup as a
tool for drafting a new constitution. At most, this research shows that “abrupt changes in regime,
in the direction of either democracy or autocracy, will increase the probability of replacement.”30
3.
Constitutional Change Surrounding Necessary Rights and Perceived Governmental
Inefficiencies
Constitutional change surrounding substantive rights and governmental structure were very
common in this period among the West African states. The constitutional changes were
expected considering the laxity of the Independence Constitutions. These changes focused on
changing their form of government, for example, several states changed from semi-presidential or
parliamentary systems of government to presidential systems of government. A more popular area
of substantive constitutional change concerned electoral processes such as changing from a one
party to a multiparty state, term limits for Presidents and other attempts to maintain a position of
power by the politicians in power. This is pertinent for the review conducted in this paper as it
draws attention to the possible outcomes of constitutional tinkering when it comes to electoral
processes. These states used their constitutions to effect this change as opposed to using Acts of
parliament or other forms of legislation. This means that there is a perception of a staying power of
constitutions and there is formality and legitimacy given to the composition of the constitution.
4.

Constitutional Referenda

Finally, there is a commonality in the use of referenda in adopting a constitution. In these
states, there have been referenda conducted to determine the entry into force of constitutions in the
state. Constitution drafting commissions and assemblies were called and discussion on the terms of
the constitution and the necessary change as discussed in the previous section that is reminiscent of
talk surrounding Independence. In fact, in some cases, it is almost exactly similar as the parties
involved remain largely the same. This is an example of how this constitutional tinkering also
enhances democratic process. In most of these constitutional referenda, the voting populace has a
See Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research Data Page, Center for Systemic Peace,
https://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html (last accessed Nov. 2019).
29 Id.
30 ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG & JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS
115 (2009)
28
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direct say as to whether they support the proposed constitution. Even though, our contemporary
example of the drawbacks of constitutional referenda is currently working its way through the public
approval process, it is still a powerful tool of gauging the will of the public on an important issue as
to the substance of the constitution.31 Here, we refer to the constitution itself.
An Historical Analysis of Nigerian Constitutional Development
The brief summary of constitutional change in West Africa shows that these states and
Nigeria are no strangers to drastic change in constitutions. It also gives some insight into the
phenomena discussed in the earlier sections on constitutional tinkering. Focusing more
specifically, this paper turns to Nigeria’s constitutional development and the concrete
changes that its constitution has experienced since its official establishment in 1914.32
Colonization
This period saw the introduction of Nigeria’s first constitutions. These include the Clifford
Constitution, the Richard Constitution, the Macpherson Constitution and the Lyttleton
Constitution.33 It is from these constitutions that an underlying theme develops and permeates
through all of Nigeria’s subsequent constitutions. Here is the evidence of the beginnings of
regionalism and divisions of power along tribal and ethnic lines that serve as the crux of Nigeria’s
post-independence constitutions.
The first constitution , the Clifford Constitution in 1922 was developed in order to provide
regulation and legislation for the southern part of the country.34 It established a Legislative Council
and an Executive Council. However, it emphasized a regional structure. The south of the country
would be governed by this Constitution and the various councils it established but the north of the
country will remain governed by Proclamations issued by the Governor-General, at the time, Hugh
Clifford. This was also the first constitution to include the elective principle and this meant that the
Legislative and Executive councils bore elected seats.35 This was a major change in the colonial
administration of the country at the time. It is important to note that the first major change
enshrined in Nigeria’s first constitution involves the availability of elective seats on the national
legislature. It also embodies the element of regionalism as this requirement was only extended to a
few seats in the South.36
The Richard Constitution that followed bore some of the same issues. Promulgated after World War
II in 1946, the Constitution sought to provide greater self-determination for Nigerians and other
Africans as well as provide a constitutional legislative framework that extended throughout the
whole country and not just the southern portion.37 This came on the heels of several negotiations
with the Crown Colony administration in Britain following the 1929 Aba Women’s Riots.38 In this
See Zack Beauchamp, The Fall of Jeremy Corbyn: Why Labor lost – and what it means for Britain, Vox Media,
https://bit.ly/35kbODS, (13th Dec. 2019).
32 See John Ademola Yakubu, Trends in Constitution-Making in Nigeria, 10 Transnat’l L. & Contemp. Probs. 424
(2000).
33 Id. The four pre-Independence constitutions were named after the colonial Governors-General that enforced
their application.
34 Id at 425.
35 Id.
36 Id. The North was excluded at the time as the British Colonial Government had a different means of governing
the region.
37 At the time, Eastern Nigeria comprised a small section of Western Cameroon as well.
38 See Adaobi Onyekagbu, The real story behind the Aba Women’s Riot and the list of people that died, Pulse NG, (8th Sept.
2019).
31
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constitution, of import was the establishment of the Regional Houses of Assembly that saw the
participation of Nigerians but again, the regional division of legislative power.
This was clamored for in the 1951 MacPherson Constitution. At this point, those who would
advocate for Nigerian independence had enjoyed the opportunity to participate in the
decisionmaking for the country and sought a greater extension of those powers as a precursor to
independence.39 There were several calls for an African-majority Legislative Council, which had
emerged as the central administrative council in charge of coordination of the regional bodies. Thus,
this constitution featured the establishment of a National Assembly comprised of the House of
Representatives which functioned as Nigeria’s central legislature and a central executive council
known as the Council of Ministers. This structure was also applied at the regional level. The last
constitution before independence was the Lyttleton constitution.40 Here, the elements of a loose
federal system of government were instituted. Thus, each region was given a form of sovereign
status, a confederation of states within Nigeria. A move that would greatly exacerbate the regional
divisions within the country.
Independence Constitution 1960
As previously mentioned, independence constitutions are important. However, they are not
so for their content but for what they represent. The independence constitution
represents validation and confirmation of a new state as well as acknowledgment of selfdetermination in some form. Negotiated independence constitutions were made to be changed.
Nigeria’s is no different. This is because the sovereignty negotiated at independence is not
sovereignty belonging to the new state but sovereignty protected and enforced by the colonial
power.41 At the time of Nigeria’s independence, the Crown maintained control over their legislature.
This means that the bills could not become law without the Queen’s approval.42 The Queen
remained the head of State and as such, all executive functions were carried out in her name. Finally,
the Queen played a role in the approval of the appointment of judges and could provide discrete
forms of relief in the criminal justice system such as entering a nolle prosequi order and offering
political pardon.43 In addition, final appeal was referred to the Privy Council in the UK. Thus, this
country may have established a form of independence but left serious questions about the extent
to which sovereignty may have been guaranteed.
The most important aspect of the independence aspect of the constitution was as an example of its
importance as a defining document. The first section of the document is the supremacy clause. It
states that,
the Constitution shall have the force of law throughout Nigeria and, subject to the provisions of
Section 4 of this Constitution, if any other law (including the constitution of a region) is inconsistent
with this Constitution shall prevail and the other law shall, to the extent of the inconsistency,
be void.44
See John Ademola Yakubu, Trends in Constitution-Making in Nigeria, 10 Transnat’l L. & Contemp. Probs. 426
(2000).
40 Id.
41 See B.O. NWABUEZE, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NIGERIA, 72-73 (1982).
42 Id at 74.
43 Id at 75.
44 NIG. CONST. (1960) §1.
39

9

This showed their readiness to seek independence. In 1957, a debate raged in the Nigeria House
of Representatives on when to seek in Independence.45
The motion before the House sought that the delegates to be sent to London for the Nigerian
Constitutional Conference should seek Independence for later that same year in 1957.46 However,
the House of Representatives expressed concerns at these debates that are eerily premonitory of the
constitutional history that would result post-Independence. In advocating for a later date of
Independence so as to have more time to plan for independence, then Minister of Transport, later
the first Prime Minister of Nigeria, Hon. Abubakar Tafawa Balewa stated that,
we will cherish the plea that the development of a federal system of government in any
country largely depends on the even progress of the units comprising the Federation… Man
at times, Sir, is by nature suspicious, and it is therefore natural for the people of the North,
though greater than the South in numerical strength, to fear domination.47
Here, his concerns reflect the entrenchment of regionalism and the fear that administration as an
independent nation has left about the individual administration of the various regions. These fears
would come to a head less than six years later when he was assassinated during a military coup
organized by military members from the South of the country.
In advocating for the same outcome, Mr. Jaja Wachuku, Representative of Aba in the House of
Representatives, later the first Speaker of the House of Representatives, first Ambassador to the UN
and the first Foreign Minister of Nigeria, stated that,
we are realistic enough to appreciate that the problem of government is not like putting off
your suit and putting it on again. There is certain preparatory work that must be done… Sir,
we must prepare for independence. If we do not want to become a laughingstock to
the world, we must prepare for this independence.48
This preparation that Mr. Wachuku spoke of included the Independence Constitution. As
is necessary in seeking independence, there is a relevant global stage and this constitution was an
opportunity to explain the success of independence to the world at large, although this may have
been short lived at the time.
Finally, Mallam Shehu Shagari, then Representative of South-West Sokoto to the House of
Representatives, later the first democratically elected President of Nigeria, summed up the necessity
of a proper plan for independence. He said,
Nigeria to-day has reached a stage in its political development when our responsible citizens
must realize that the achievement of freedom or self-government or independence … is not
an end in itself. It is not even a means to an end but only an awakening to the realization of
greater responsibilities, immense sacrifices and still desirous of unlimited courage. It is high
time we put up our plans for an independent Nigeria. Until this is done, all talk about such
freedom or independence is merely empty.49
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF NIGERIA, NIGERIA DEBATES INDEPENDENCE ON 26 MARCH 1957 AS RECORDED
IN THE OFFICIAL REPORT (1957).
45

Id.
Id at 17.
48 Id at 12.
49 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF NIGERIA, NIGERIA DEBATES INDEPENDENCE ON 26 MARCH 1957 AS RECORDED
IN THE OFFICIAL REPORT 48-9 (1957)
46
47
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Practically, the Independence Constitution also foreshadowed difficulties that will arise
regarding the elections process. There was a section of the Constitution that concerned matters that
were insulated from control by ministers. This established that the conduct of legislative elections
was to be entrusted to independent commissions, the electoral commissions established directly by
the Constitution for the federation and for each region. It explicitly stated that in the conduct of
elections, each commission shall be free from control by any other person or authority. There were
some exceptions for officers from the appropriate houses of legislature for the delimitation of voter
constituencies. Finally, it provided for the involvement of both the executive and legislature in the
appointment of persons to form the election committee. It also prevented removal except for cause,
that is inability or misbehavior.50
Republican Constitution of 1963
This constitution marks a change in the system of government in Nigeria. “One of the most
significant changes made by the 1963 Constitution was to sweep away the imperial basis of the preexisting constitution.”51 The change from monarchy to republic is significant in our analysis as this
marked a definite attempt for autonomous rule within the nation. From here on, constitutions
developed would be based on a derivation of legitimacy that was not guaranteed by the British
government but by the will of the Nigerian people.52 In establishing a break from monarchical
government, this constitution introduced a President of the Republic who was the Head of State and
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Thus, vesting the executive authority retained by the
Queen within the Nigerian government.53 It vested the judicial power retained by the Privy Council
in the UK, in the newly created Supreme Court of Nigeria. Finally, it removed the legislative
approval power retained by the British government and created a veto system with the Executive
and the Legislature. It also sought to provide a federal system of government for the country. 54
This is important in establishing concepts of separation of powers and the nature of the
various governmental branches. This constitution retained the same features of the 1960
Constitution with regards to the insulation of particular organs of government from influence by
the executive, legislative and judicial branches. It also maintained a parliamentary system of
government.55
Constitution of Military Government
Military government is complex because it is based on and full of contradictions. In Nigeria’s
case, military rule poses a lot of constitutional issues particularly those regarding the legitimacy of
military decrees, actions to be taken against those who plotted the coup (so called, "coup plotters”),
transition from military to civilian rule and finally, resolution of conflicts between military decrees
and existing constitutional provisions. Although there have been 8 coups in Nigeria’s history, the
first presents the most interesting constitutional question and illustrates the main arguments of this
paper. On January 15th, 1966, a coup was executed by disgruntled young majors within the Nigerian
army led by the charismatic Major Chukwuemeka Kaduna Nzeogwu.56 He gathered a small force of
other majors and officers of similar rank and assassinated the Prime Minister, Alhaji Tafawa Balewa,
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the Premier of the Northern Region, Alhaji Ahmadu Bello, the Premier of the Western Region,
Chief Samuel Ladoke Akintola and the Minister of Finance, Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh.57
The reasons for this coup begin with the controversy surrounding the 1964 national
elections. These elections embodied the issues with the administration of the government and the
electoral process that plague Nigeria today. The political parties were not national in character but
regional. The elections of 1959 did not leave any party with a majority. Thus, two parties formed
a coalition, the Northern Peoples’ Congress (“NPC”) and the National Convention of Nigerian
Citizens (“NCNC”) under the leadership of Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe. This formulation was unlikely
given the tribes represented but created a path for integration of Northern and Southern tribes.58
This coalition held together under the mutual hostility towards the Action Group (‘AG”) party.59 A
new state was carved out of their region which exacerbated tensions in the region. In 1962, a state of
emergency was declared in the region and several prominent AG party members were arrested. As a
result of all this, the party was devastated.60 This crisis led to a realignment of the political parties
bringing the United Progressive Grand Alliance, (“UPGA”) and the Nigerian National Alliance
(“NNA”) parties to the fore.61 These two parties would contest in the 1964 elections in addition to
NCNC, NPC and AG. There was a reign of terror instigated by each party to gain votes in the
election. This encouraged a widespread thuggery, vandalism and violence all throughout the days
leading up to the election. This was so great that the NPC, AG and the NCNC all threatened to
secede from the federation.62 As a result of this, the western region (now AG and UPGA) staged a
boycott of the elections.63
At this point, the elections were conducted amidst widespread violence and disruption. The
results were disputed by all parties and there was a call for a cancellation of the results and a new
election. The new election took place in 1965 but with continued disputes by all parties. It was this
constant disruption and scrambling for power by all the major party leaders including, Alhaji
Ahmadu Bello and others that spurred the coup in January 1966.64 The January 1966 Coup serves as
a template for analyzing the other coups that occurred in Nigeria.
An interesting case decided by the Nigerian Supreme Court in 1970 provides analysis into
the January 1966 coup and the legal standing of the military government, the constitution and
Nigeria’s sovereignty.65 In Lakanmi v. The Attorney-General (West), a public officer, not affiliated with
the military, under the regime of Colonel Yakubu Gowon, (who became Head of State and Supreme
Commander of the Armed Forces as the result of a coup in July of 1966), was cited for allegedly
corrupt practices.66 A military commission of inquiry found him and others guilty of corruption and
recommended the forfeiture of their assets to the Federal Military Government, (“FMG”). In
contesting this in the Ibadan High Court, Lakanmi asserted that Public Officers Edict of 1967 under
which the order of forfeiture was given was inconsistent with the Public Officers Edict of 1966. 67
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They asserted this position so as to invalidate the application of the decrees and retain
Constitutional protections.68
At the Nigerian Supreme Court, the issue raised was whether the Federal Military
Government was a revolutionary government under which the Constitution bore no legal
significance or a constitutional interim government that must ensure the continued existence of
the constitution.69 In answering this question, the court determined that Lakanmi had successfully
argued the necessity doctrine as applicable in this case. Here, the court stated that the hand-over
of power to the armed forces took place by virtue of the necessity doctrine and so was consistent
with the constitution.70 As such, the constitution must be upheld by the
interim constitutional government. The necessity doctrine states that it was necessary as a matter
of national emergency and exigent circumstances at the time of the coup for the civilian government
to hand over power to a military government and this was done in order to preserve the sovereignty
of the state.71 In rejecting the revolutionary government claim, the court found that because those
who effected the coup, (Major Kaduna Nzeogwu and others) were not connected to those who
ultimately took power, (Major General Aguiyi-Ironsi), it is not the case that the Federal
Military Government as it exists is a revolutionary government.72 The importance of then
maintaining the constitution is then emphasized here. Even where violence, constitutional crises and
military government had occurred, the constitution remained paramount.
The court recognized that it cannot “expect that constitutions make provisions for all
exigencies. No constitution can anticipate all the different forms of phenomena which may beset a
nation.”73 The constitutional inquiry here continues to be interesting as the doctrine of necessity was
read in as a legal and constitutional argument by virtue of the common law system. In effect,
the judicial branch of the government is informing a military power of its constitutional validity
using an extraconstitutional doctrine. Through that doctrine, the object here was to “save the state
and society from destruction and if this can be done only by abdicating sovereign power to a body
best able to achieve the object, then abdication of sovereignty ought to be within the permissible
ambit of the doctrine.”74This further means that the FMG was handed the entire sovereignty of the
state. Part and parcel of that sovereignty is the constitution. To then answer the issue in the case, the
court then stated that the FMG had sufficiently established through military decree, its ability to
create laws as well as its ability to amend the constitution. The latter power is not unfettered or
limitless. It is governed by the doctrine of necessity as it existed at the time of the exigency. Thus,
this particular decree seeking to amend the constitution and take such corruption claims out of
the ambit of the judiciary is unconstitutional.
This case is highlighted as an important illustration of not only the importance of the
constitution, but the effectiveness of constitutional norms to ensure some form of democratic
process. An underlying question and concept throughout the case was whether the existence of a
constitution was as important or even more important than the retention of sovereignty. As this case
The constitution referred to here is the 1963 Constitution.
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describes, the answer is twofold. First, in Nigeria, the constitution here forms as a source of
legitimacy for the government itself. You could say that in deciding in this manner, the court
considered its own existence, for it would not be so but for the existence of the
Constitution. Second, without the constitution, military decrees offer no accountability. Throughout
the case’s procedural history, several decrees were issued to maintain the FMG’s power to issue such
orders of forfeiture without judicial review. As in Marbury v. Madison, the case marks a daring
intervention into the executive power but also, a strong endorsement for the applicability of the
constitution.
1979 Constitution
Nigeria returned to civilian rule on October 1, 1979 with the adoption of the
1979 Constitution. The main change here from the 1963 constitution is the switch from a
parliamentary system of government to a presidential system of government.75 This constitution
showed the work of the Constituent Assembly which had been assembled by the
immediately preceding military government led by General Olusegun Obasanjo (later President of
Nigeria) The presidential system of government was chosen to combat the failings of the
parliamentary system which had seen the state besieged by military overthrow and civil war all due to
the previous civilian government’s inability to form a cohesive government at the 1964 elections.
The perceived inefficiencies sought to be corrected by the presidential system include the following;
conflict and instability arising from the separation of the head of the executive from the head
of government, complexity and uncertainty of government relations and the weakening of leadership
by collective power and responsibility.
In forms of solutions made in the presidential system adopted in the constitution, Chapter II on
the fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy embodies the ideals. In drafting
this chapter at the Constituent Assembly, Prof. B.O. Nwabueze stated that,
A constitution operating as law and imposing judicially enforceable restraints upon
government should not abandon its other function as a source of legitimacy for those
political concepts and governmental relations are, by their very nature non-justiciable. Nor
should it renounce its role in the affirmation of fundamental objectives and ideals or
directive principles of government which serve to inform and inspire governmental actions
along desirable lines. It is in this combination of judicially enforceable restraints and the
legitimation of needed non-justiciable government powers and relations that the singular
achievement of the US Constitution lies.76
Here, Prof. Nwabueze is discussing that oft fraught dichotomy between true sovereign power a
nd the needs for control over the various political branches.
This is a salient discussion for the inquiry carried out by this essay because the discussion of the
importance of electoral management and the elections process forms a judicially enforceable
restraint that may also cross into the realm of the fundamental objectives necessary to inform and
inspire governmental action. Finally, this constitution offers the federal character of the nation.
This provision in §14(3) of Chapter II of the Constitution acknowledges that with the heterogenous
population there have been issues with regards to composition of government agencies either
favoring or disfavoring members of certain tribes or ethnic groups.77
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In response to this, the federal character provision states,
The composition of the Government of the Federation or any of its agencies and the
conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such manner as to reflect the federal character of
Nigeria and the need to promote national unity, and also to command national loyalty
thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few States or from a
few ethnic or other sectional groups in that government or in any of its agencies.78
This provision is also important in establishing the issues to be faced by any national electoral
commission going forward. The 1979 constitution did not address those issues itself, but the 1999
constitution, which is still in force with amendments today, will.
1999 Constitution and Current Amendments
This constitution entered into force on May 29th, 1999. The 1999 constitution comes as an
amendment to the 1979 constitution.79 In 1998, Gen. Abdulsalami Abubakar agreed to hand over
power to a democratically elected civilian President in 1999.80 In the same year, he adopted the 1979
Constitution as to be entered into force upon the successful completion of elections in 1999. In
effort to carry out this promise, he created the Independent National Electoral Commission and
appointed a former Supreme Court Justice, Ephraim Akpata to be its first chairman.81 The 1999
constitution remained as the 1979 Constitution and adopted only a few amendments. It is under this
constitution that this inquiry finds grounds to appeal for constitutional guarantees for a democratic
national election management process.
The Nigerian Electoral Process
The current Nigerian electoral process is best exemplified by looking at the process of the
2019 general elections. The 2019 elections were "marred by violence and intimidation, with the role
of the security agencies becoming more contentious as the process progressed.,” “this damaged the
integrity of the electoral process and may deter future participation.”82 In the early hours of February
16th, the Independent National Electoral Commission, (“INEC”) announced that the presidential
and national assembly elections scheduled to take place that very day, were postponed to the
following week. The Chairman of INEC, Mahmood Yakubu stated that “the commission came to
the conclusion that proceeding with the election as scheduled is no longer feasible.”83 No
further explanation was provided for this change. This change led to widespread accusations of
corruption as the move was seen to greatly disadvantage the opposition party PDP as they
had already spent large amounts of money ferrying agents all over the country to coordinate
voting initiatives and had to spend more money to ensure they were present for the new election
date. In contrast, the ruling party, APC, whose President Muhammadu Buhari was running for
reelection, did not have to spend nearly as much because they relied on government institutions
to coordinate their voting initiatives.84 The election related violence involved disruptions to
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polling centers preventing complete collection of ballots and extending the voting in certain areas.85
Incumbent President Buhari won his second term against his major opponent former Vice President
Atiku Abubakar and his party, PDP.
The issues in that election administration can be shown through a description of the
Nigerian electoral process as it currently exists. Electoral governance involves the interaction of
constitutional, legal and institutional rules and organizational practices that determine the basic rules
for election procedures and electoral competition; organize campaigns, voter registration, and
election day tallies; and resolve disputes and certify results.86 (cite Omotola 539) Thus, such
electoral management boards are part of "a set of institutions and rules that together determine the
probity of electoral processes and in emerging democracies, where administrative processes are weak
and distrust across political actors is high, their role at the center of electoral processes tends to be
more visible.”87 (cite Omotola 539)
The Constitution lays out the functions, composition and powers of INEC. These are important to
analyze as the Constitution is not the only source of INEC’s powers. In 2010, the national assembly
passed the Electoral Act which provides for more powers, structure and formation for INEC as well
as for state independent electoral commissions.88 As we will see, it may be problematic what
functions and powers are prescribed in the Constitution as opposed to in the Act.
The 1999 Constitution establishes INEC under §153 while its functions and powers are
outlined in the Third Schedule to the Constitution, part 1 item F, paragraphs 14 and 15. The
Constitution provides that INEC
a. “organize, undertake and supervise all elections to the offices of the President and VicePresident, the Governor and Deputy Governor of a state and to the membership of the
Senate, the House of Representatives and the Houses of Assembly of each State of the
Federation;”
b. register political parties in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution and an Act
of the National Assembly;
c. monitor the organization and operation of the political parties, including their finances;
d. arrange for the annual examination and auditing of the funds and accounts of political
parties , and publish a report on such examination and audit for public information;
e. arrange and conduct the registration of persons qualified to vote and prepare, maintain
and revise the register of voters for the purpose of any election under this Constitution
f. monitor political campaigns and provide rules and regulations which shall govern the
political parties;
g. ensure that all Electoral Commissioners and Returning Officers take and subscribe the
Oath of Office prescribed by law
h. delegate any of its powers to any Resident Electoral Commissioner; and
i. carry out such other functions as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National
Assembly.89
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The Constitution, therefore, highlights the core functions of INEC and also details the composition
of the Commission. These include a Chairman and twelve other members called National Electoral
Commissioners. The Chairman of INEC is to be appointed by the President subject to
Senate approval and in consultation with the Council of State. A key update in the 1999 constitution
is that it provides INEC with the power to delimit and create senatorial districts for election to the
senate and the constituencies for the election to the House of Representatives.90 The Constitution
otherwise maintains the independence of the electoral commission by stating that “in exercising its
power to make appointments or to exercise disciplinary control over persons,…, the Independent
National Electoral Commission shall not be subject to the direction or control of any other authority
or person.”91 (§158)
The Electoral Act of 2010 provides a broader definition of the powers and provides more rules
and guidelines for INEC. This stems from (i) as stated in the Constitution. Thus, the national
assembly has constitutional authority to regulate INEC. The relevant provisions in the Act include;
civic and voter education, cancelling election results, maintenance of the voter register, print and
issue of voter’s register and cards, issuance of duplicate voter cards, registration and deregistration of
political parties, giving notice of elections, establishment of polling units, prosecution of
electoral offenses.92
The electoral process in the country is then wholly controlled by INEC who in turn is a
creature of the Executive and the Legislature. The executive has primary control over
appointment while the legislature maintains control over the more functional aspects. The
Constitution, however, provides a substantive check. In 2018, the National Assembly
proposed amendments to the 2010 Electoral Act.93 The changes they suggested involved scheduling
the presidential election to follow the gubernatorial and state houses of assembly elections. The
current Act allows for national assembly elections, presidential elections and then state house
assembly and gubernatorial elections.94 However, the Constitution provides some discretion for
INEC to select the timing of elections. Despite that fact, timing was prescribed in the Electoral Act
and then sought to be amended in 2018 but then vetoed by the President on the grounds that it
went against the Constitution. This back and forth shows that at base the Constitution is an
important consideration because even with these rules, INEC still set its own schedule for
the national elections providing for the presidential elections and national assembly elections taking
place at the same time and the state house and gubernatorial election occurring the following month.
Here, we see the impact of enshrining such powers in the Constitution.
Factors Impacting Nigerian Elections
The previous section noted the electoral process and which bodies are in charge of
supervising and conducting the elections. For the major races, the entire process of the election
from setting the time, registering the political parties, providing rules for campaigns, campaign
financing, registering voters, organizing the actual voting, tallying the votes, releasing the results
and prosecuting election offenses, is handled by one organization, INEC. This means that they wield
a lot of power, however with the constant reports of election violence, particularly with the
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accusations of election rigging, INEC is not fully able to complete its mandate. Here are the factors
impacting the efficacy of INEC and Nigerian elections.
Partisanship and Control
The over-centralization of power is pertinent here. Due to the current structure of
INEC’s powers, all parties in power have sought to maintain this equilibrium to ensure that INEC is
particularly reliant on the whims of the Presidency to carry out its duties. As such, depending on the
party in power, INEC’s guidelines may reflect a specific party’s intentions over the other. This was
particularly the accusation by opposing parties during the 2019 election scandal. This also implies
that partisan control provides structural limitations on INEC power, which it does. The primary area
in this consideration is composition. In the constitution, the composition is dictated by the President
with consultation from the Council of State and approval by the National Assembly, however this is
not a true check on the Executive’s power to dominate the appointments process. It is still the case
that the persons that the President selects are ultimately approved by the corresponding authorities.
This is also because the President’s party is also the party in power at the legislative level.
Thus, in order to ensure that these officials do not engage in partisan policymaking, there should be
more restrictions imposed that determine who may be a viable candidate for the position. As this is
only made clear for the Chairman, this solution should extend to the other members of the
Commission particularly the regional commissioners. In addition to recommendations on the
composition of the committee, job security also needs to be considered. Under the constitution, the
Committee members may be removed for cause and are only in power for term of 5 years. This has
been done twice before under the Babangida military regime and the Chairmen who were dismissed
were both professors and they were dismissed for vague and questionable reasons.95 The first was
Prof. Eme Awa, who was removed for his uncompromising stance on the management of the
electoral commission, the second was Prof. Humphrey Nwosu who decided not to follow
the military government’s decision to annul the 1993 presidential elections.96 This then leads to the
issue of funding. Funding is important to establish true independence of the Commission. The
constitution does not provide for an independent source of funding for the Commission, rather it is
determined as a part of the executive branch budget determination. This leaves INEC entirely
beholden to the express whims of the President or the party in power to determine what functions
it may carry out.
Infrastructure
As a result of the lack of funding, job security and independence, infrastructure is a
major issue affecting the proper conduction and function of INEC. This includes the coordination
of the bureaucracy and particularly, the on the ground implantation of the elections themselves. This
tight control by the other branches of government has constrained the capability of INEC. It is now
reliant on ad hoc staff to implement the electoral process. This is problematic because INEC is a
federal body and a creature of the national constitution, there is a problem with gathering volunteers
and with a lack of infrastructure, it is difficult to coordinate with state departments
to organize people to work at the polls and to help with voter registration. This is such a problem
that after almost every election, INEC has a tendency to lay some of the blame on their temporary
staff.
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Non-structural Factors
Asides from factors relating to composition and structure of INEC, there are other
extraconstitutional factors that adversely impact its effectivity in conducting elections. The
most important of which involves reachability. Due to the landscape and geographical formations
across the state, there are some parts that are far more difficult to reach than others which
exacerbates the problems of funding and ad hoc staff. This also dovetails into the security issues in
certain regions of the country. In the middle between the Northern and Southern sections of the
country, the Middle Belt region is besieged by attacks from nomadic herdsmen, in the far
northeastern region, Boko Haram has maintained a stranglehold on the people and resources of the
region.97 As a result of Boko Haram’s terrorist activities in the region, large numbers of people have
been forced from their homes thus leading to a huge internal displaced persons issue in
the surrounding states in the region. Finally, in the southern Delta region, there are environmental
issues related to oil spills in the region rendering many people in the area homeless.98 All these
factors affect the reachability of these individuals and lead election results to not be representative of
the public at large.
Future Outlook
This section seeks to analyze how these issues may be dealt with using the main tool
identified in the previous sections, that is, constitutional tinkering. It has been demonstrated
that constitutional tinkering may provide a broader means of evaluating the effectiveness of the
democratic institutions being employed by the state. It has also been shown that constitutions form
an important part of government and have remarkable staying power particularly within West
African states. In Nigeria, there needs to be a serious reorganization of INEC to provide for certain
constitutional guarantees. The justifications for these not only arise from the theories discussed in
previous sections of this paper but from the general tenets of international law which will be
discussed below.
A Constitutionally Regulated INEC
The major question here is a discussion as to whether this constitutional change would go in
the direction of a more centralized or a more decentralized set of rules surrounding electoral
commissions. This is an important discussion as it defines the structure by which INEC would
operate. Looking at the issues illustrated above, there are clear benefits to engaging in a
decentralized set of rules in order to reduce the possibility of partisan control by the
federal government. It will encourage greater civic participation in the conduct of elections and
allow for innovations in different areas in not only the conduct of elections but voter registration,
education, etc. It might follow the example of other countries such as the UK and the US, both of
which allow for local governments to conduct their elections.99 Thus, not only would
decentralization encourage the participation of the public at large in the conduct of elections but
may also reduce the costs of having to hire more official rather than ad hoc staff for such a
limited purpose. Finally, decentralization may cure concerns of public distrust in the institution
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and tribal affiliation. In order to achieve this however, INEC needs stricter regulation enshrined in
the Constitution, in addition to stricter protections for state independent electoral commissions. In
the constitution needs to be strict guarantees on funding, job security and delegations of power, in
particular provisions that stipulate the decentralization of the election operations headed by the
Independent National Electoral Commission. In practice, this requires an evaluation of the most
effective and efficient means of delineating the exact process of engaging in a decentralization
mechanism that is able to promote the operation and capabilities of democratic institutions in the
state. The Constitution is not the only means through which electoral reform may be carried out.
There are certain advances in technology that are currently being tried out by local governments in
local elections that have been very successful. There is an argument that a broader controlled
attempt on a national scale may be equally successful.100
The International Independent electoral commission
In international law, there is not a lot of scholarship for what the standards should be in this
field. This is mostly because of the following reasons; electoral management bodies are seen as
distinct creatures of the state and it is difficult to frame an international framework based on vastly
different local standards. However, there is some consensus in the international community on
the distinct function of electoral management bodies and their impact on the function of other
democratic institutions. The main conclusion is that newer democracies tend to trend towards
independent committees with centralized power. However, as pointed out in the previous section, it
may be even more stabilizing for there to be a decentralized set of rules surrounding electoral
management boards. The important emphasis here is not only the independence of these electoral
institutions but an independence that is defined in terms of funding, appointment, job security
and infrastructure. A standard for electoral committees must emphasize independence above all else.
It is in this manner that true democracy may be guaranteed such that it reflects public opinion.101
Conclusion
This paper has argued for the firm inclusion in the Nigerian Constitution certain safeguards
to protect the integrity of the Independent National Electoral Commission. In highlighting this
aspect, this paper analyzed the importance of constitutions, their staying power and the particular
implications this has for relatively newer democracies in West Africa. In that vein, there is much
more to be said on the impact of constitutional change on democratic institutions. However, this
paper shows that with regards to electoral systems, such constitutional guarantees are necessary to
the proper functioning of newer democracies.102
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